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 The presence of numerous high profile targets in and around Washington, DC, has 
raised significant policy concerns over how to effectively defend these sites from possible 
terrorist threats involving aircraft. Domestic airspace protection, particularly in the 
National Capital Region (NCR) has become a significant focus of homeland security and 
homeland defense efforts following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.1 
However, airspace restrictions and special flight rules implemented to address security 
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Since September 11, 2001, several actions have been taken to monitor and protect the 
airspace around Washington, DC. However, many general aviation (GA) interests 
have protested that extensive airspace restrictions and complex procedures exceed 
what is necessary to protect critical assets from possible terrorist attacks using aircraft. 
Policymakers have struggled to address airspace protection needs without unduly 
impeding air commerce or compromising safety. While the administration is currently 
seeking to make the airspace restrictions in the National Capital Region permanent, 
Congress has pushed for an easing of restrictions on GA aircraft at Ronald Reagan 
Washington National Airport (DCA) and nearby GA airports through legislation and 
oversight. However, a few high profile airspace breaches have prompted some in 
Congress to seek stiffer penalties for violators and mandatory training for pilots (see 
H.R. 3465). Better pilot training and technologies to improve pilot situational 
awareness may help curtail inadvertent airspace violations that complicate surveillance 
and protection efforts. Further assessment of airspace design and special flight 
procedures around Washington, DC, may be undertaken to determine whether an 
appropriate balance exists between homeland security and defense requirements and 
air commerce and safety. This report will be updated as needed. 
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concerns in the NCR have been contentious because of their impact on air commerce, 
particularly general aviation (GA) operations.2 
 
 Congressional action and oversight has sought to strike a balance that adequately 
meets the critical needs to protect high-profile assets in the NCR while minimizing 
economic impacts. Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) mandated a security plan to resume GA 
flights at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) and congressional 
oversight, in part, led to the easing of flight restrictions at the three GA airports lying 
within the 15-mile restricted airspace around Washington, DC. While these actions have 
served to enhance accessibility to the NCR by GA aircraft in furtherance of air commerce 
in the region, the Capitol Airspace Enforcement Act (H.R. 3465) seeks to impose 
statutory suspensions of pilot licenses and increase civil and criminal penalties for 
airspace violators. The bill would also require mandatory pilot training in an effort to 
curtail inadvertent airspace violations that complicate the task of defending the NCR 
airspace from possible aerial attack. Critics of this measure argue that stiff penalties will 
do little to curb inadvertent violations and extensive pilot education efforts are already 
underway.3 GA advocates also worry that harsher penalties will further damage aviation-
related businesses in the area. 
 
 In August 2005, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in consultation with 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense, proposed 
to make permanent the special flight rules — that currently exist on a temporary basis — 
to monitor flights over a wide area around the NCR.4 GA user groups, who had hoped the 
temporary restrictions would be eased or lifted, have decried this move as largely 
unnecessary and overly restrictive and fear that the proposal would negatively impact GA 
pilots and further jeopardize aviation-related businesses in the region.5 
 
 Airspace Restrictions and Special Flight Rules. The airspace in the NCR 
has been placed under close surveillance and special flight restrictions primarily affecting 
GA aircraft ever since September 11, 2001. Previously, the airspace around Washington, 
DC was relatively open and accessible to GA as well as commercial aircraft. While the 
airspace directly above some sensitive locations — like the White House and the Capitol 
— was then and still is prohibited airspace (i.e., off-limits to all civil aircraft), this 
comprised a relatively small portion of the total airspace in the NCR. Before September 
11, 2001, GA aircraft were routinely permitted to operate over Washington, DC, and the 
surrounding area so long as these prohibited areas were avoided and applicable air traffic 
procedures were followed. DCA, in close proximity to downtown Washington, DC, and 
key federal facilities, was open and accessible to most GA aircraft. However, over the 
past 4 years, airspace restrictions in the Washington, DC region have gone through 
several significant changes to address heightened security concerns. 
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2 General aviation includes most operations other than scheduled airline and military flights. 
3 Spencer S. Hsu. “Bill Targets Errant Pilots.” The Washington Post, July 27, 2005, p. B1. 
4 Federal Aviation Administration. “Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules 
Area; Proposed Rule.” Federal Register, 70(149), 45250-45261 (August 4, 2005). 
5 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. Air Traffic Services Brief: Security Officials Want 
Washington, DC, Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) to Be Made Permanent (August 16, 





 The Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). As flight operations resumed following 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a no fly zone — 25-nautical miles6 in radius, 
extending from the surface to 18,000 feet — around Washington, DC, was established. 
All civil airports within this area, including DCA remained closed to both the airlines and 
GA traffic. Commercial flights gradually resumed at DCA starting in early October 2001, 
and limited GA operations were permitted in the airspace within the18 to 25-nautical 
mile ring around DCA. In December 2001, the size of the restricted airspace around 
Washington, DC, was reduced to roughly a 15-nautical mile radius, the dimensions that 
continue to exist today for the area known as the flight restricted zone (FRZ). 
 
 The Maryland Three Airports. In February 2002, the ban on GA operations in 
the FRZ was eased somewhat, permitting the three GA airports located within its 
boundaries — referred to as the Maryland three or sometimes the DC-three airports — to  
reopen on a limited basis.7 Potomac Airfield, Washington Executive Airport/Hyde Field, 
and College Park Airport, resumed operations of based aircraft whose pilots were vetted 
through background checks and adhered to strict security protocols. In February 2005, 
FRZ restrictions were further relaxed allowing transient aircraft to fly to and from these 
airports provided that their pilots had passed background checks, received special 
training, and adhered to specific security procedures.8 The reopening of these airports has 
been a politically sensitive issue. Both Washington Executive and Potomac airports are 
operated by small business entities that have been significantly impacted by the flight 
restrictions, while College Park airport — established in 1909 as a site for the Wright 
brothers to train military aviators — is considered the world’s oldest continuously 
operated airport. 
 
 The Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). In February 2003, additional 
steps were taken to secure the skies above Washington, DC, by establishing an outer area, 
beyond the FRZ, where GA flights must operate under close surveillance and in constant 
2-way radio contact with air traffic controllers. This area is known as the Washington, 
DC Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The ADIZ came into existence, not 
immediately following September 11, 2001, as many mistakenly assume, but rather as 
part of Operation Liberty Shield, launched by the DHS to enhance homeland security 
during the build-up toward the war in Iraq. The Washington ADIZ was established as a 
temporary flight restriction, and a similar ADIZ was established around New York City. 
A smaller scale restricted area was put in place over downtown Chicago during that time. 
The temporary restrictions in New York and Chicago have since been rescinded, but the 
Washington, DC, ADIZ remains. 
 
 In policy discussions, the ADIZ has often been oversimplified, described as being 
simply a 30-nautical mile ring around Washington, DC. The dimensions of the ADIZ are, 
in fact, quite a bit larger than this. The ADIZ, shown in Figure 1, roughly consists of the 
________________________________________________________________________ 
6 Nautical miles are the standard measure of distance in aviation. One nautical mile is roughly 
equal to 1.15 statute miles. 
7 Federal Aviation Administration. “Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain 
Airports in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area; Final Rule”. 
Federal Register, 67(33), 7538-7545 (February 10, 2005). 
8 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1562, Subpart A. 
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30-nautical mile ring around DCA plus the additional airspace extending for 20 nautical 
miles around both Dulles (IAD) and Baltimore-Washington International (BWI) airports. 
The ADIZ has a lateral extent — not including the flight restricted zone (FRZ) which it 
completely encapsulates — of more than 3,000 square nautical miles. The FRZ roughly 
follows a 15-nautical mile radius around DCA and thus blankets an additional 700 square 
nautical miles. Both the ADIZ and the FRZ extend from the surface to 18,000 feet. 
Figure 1. National Capital Region Airspace Restrictions 
 
     Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176), enacted in December 2003, included language requiring 
the FAA to justify the continued existence of the ADIZ and identify any possible changes 
to improve the operational efficiency or minimize the operational impact on pilots and 
controllers. In January 2004, special procedures were implemented at many of the 
airports on the outer edges of the ADIZ for aircraft departing the airspace to reduce pilot 
and controller workload. Similarly, special arrival and departure procedures were 
instituted at two airports located on Kent Island in the Chesapeake Bay. These measures 
had been tested during a brief trial period in October 2003, but were implemented on a 
continuous basis beginning in January 2004, in part, due to the congressional mandate to 
improve operational efficiency within the ADIZ. Since then, no additional changes have 
been made to the ADIZ. 
 
 The FAA’s Proposed Special Flight Rules Area. On August 4, 2005, the 
FAA unveiled plans to create a permanent special flight rules area (SFRA), virtually 
identical to the temporary flight restrictions currently in place for the ADIZ and FRZ.9 
User groups have decried the move to make these restrictions permanent questioning why 
such a large restricted area and complex security procedures are necessary on a long-term 
basis. GA users had long hoped that, instead, the ADIZ would eventually be rescinded 
and fear that this proposed action will have lasting impacts on aviation-related businesses 
in the region. According to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), business 
at GA airports in the region has already declined 30% to 50%, and fuel sales are off by 
________________________________________________________________________ 
9 Federal Aviation Administration. “Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules.” 
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as much as 45% since the temporary airspace restrictions were put into effect.10 
Implementing these airspace protections also involves a sizable federal investment, 
costing about $11 million annually according to FAA estimates.11 Insofar as these 
measures can help deter or avert a terrorist attack, these costs are likely to be considered 
reasonable. However, questions remain regarding whether less costly alternatives could 
provide equally adequate protections. The size and shape of the proposed SFRA and the 
specific security requirements to operate within this area remain central issues in the 
debate over how to best protect assets in the NCR from possible attacks using aircraft 
without unduly impeding air commerce or compromising aviation safety. 
 
     Restoring General Aviation at DCA. While the FAA has initiated action to make 
the security features of the NCR airspace permanent, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) has issued rulemaking to fulfill the congressional mandate to 
restore GA operations at DCA, albeit on a very limited basis initially. Prior to September 
11, 2001, DCA’s easy access to downtown Washington, DC and northern Virginia made 
it a popular destination for GA operators, especially corporate and charter jets. However, 
the proximity of DCA to critical federal facilities and other high profile targets has long 
concerned security experts. These concerns prompted special precautions for airline 
flights and a ban on GA flights at DCA following the 9/11 attacks. As a result, GA 
takeoffs and landings at DCA fell from a level of about 60,000 in FY2000 to the current 
level of about 3,500 annually conducted under special waivers.12 Recognizing the impact 
of these restrictions on GA operators, Congress included the aforementioned language  in 
Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) requiring the DHS to develop and implement a security plan to 
resume GA operations at DCA. That security plan was put into effect on August 18, 
2005, and will accommodate up to 48 GA flights per day into and out of DCA, roughly 
60% of pre-9/11 levels.13 Operators will have to adhere to stringent requirements 
including: submitting all flight crew to background checks; vetting all passengers and 
crew against terrorist watchlists; undergoing physical screening of all passengers, crew, 
aircraft, and baggage at DCA prior to departure or at one of 12 designated gateway 
airports prior to continuing to DCA; and posting armed security officers on each flight. 
Operators must reimburse the TSA for the costs of these measures. Reimbursable security 
costs will vary based on the number of passengers, but are expected to average about 
$500 per flight. Initially the program will only be available to certain charter and  
corporate aircraft operators. The TSA may expand the program to privately-owned 
aircraft in about one year, although, as currently implemented, it is likely to be too costly 
and burdensome to appeal to typical GA operators. 
 
     Curbing Airspace Violations. While security measures are being implemented 
authorizing certain GA operations within the restricted airspace, curtailing frequent 
inadvertent airspace violations by unauthorized aircraft that complicate surveillance and 
defense efforts is an ongoing challenge. According to NCR Command Center statistics, 
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10 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. Air Traffic Services Brief: Security Officials Want. 
11 Federal Aviation Administration. “Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules.” 
12 Federal Aviation Administration. Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) database. 
13 Transportation Security Administration. “Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: 
Enhanced Security Procedures for Certain Operations; Interim Final Rule. Federal Register, 
70(137)41586-41603 (July 19, 2005). 
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there were almost 3,500 airspace incursions between January 27, 2003, when the center 
first opened, and July 17, 2005 — a rate of almost 4 incidents per day.14 On 655 of these 
occasions, “government assets” were deployed or diverted to intercept the intruding 
aircraft. Based on this experience, about 1 in every 5 to 6 incursions requires an intercept, 
and this occurs about 5 times a week. However, all but one of these incidents was 
inadvertent.15 In three high profile incidents, all inadvertent, the U.S. Capitol was 
evacuated, raising concerns over the adequacy of airspace protections among lawmakers. 
 
     Curbing inadvertent violations is likely to become increasingly important as more GA 
operations return to DCA and the Maryland three airports making the task of surveillance 
and tactical response all the more critical. Pilot training is likely to be an important tool 
for mitigating these inadvertent airspace violations. In fact, significant efforts have been 
made already by user groups such as the AOPA, in coordination with the FAA, to 
increase pilot awareness and understanding of the airspace restrictions. Since these 
airspace violations are still routinely occurring despite these efforts, additional measures 
to improve in-flight situational awareness may be needed. Available technologies may 
provide GA pilots with improved positional awareness to avoid airspace violations. For 
example, global positioning satellite (GPS) moving map displays can provide pilots with 
precise navigation capabilities. These systems are now widely available for use in GA 
aircraft and could be programmed to include features to raise situational awareness 
regarding airspace restrictions and requirements. A more controversial option under 
consideration is stiffer penalties and stepped-up enforcement for airspace violations. User 
groups oppose additional punitive actions beyond those already available to the FAA and 
point out that the threat of a shoot-down is already a strong enough deterrent for pilots to 
take heed.16 
 
     Finding the Right Balance. Determining an acceptable balance between airspace 
restrictions and alternative security measures — such as vetting and security screening 
for certain flight operations — that will maintain effective airspace protection in the NCR 
without unduly impeding air commerce or compromising safety continues to play a 
central role in policy debate over NCR airspace restrictions. While most agree that 
blanket airspace restrictions for all non-airline users creates a significant impediment to 
air commerce in the region, there are varying opinions on whether the derived security 
benefits outweigh these concerns and whether alternative measures create unacceptable 
security risks. Detailed risk-based assessments, examining the various different types of 
GA operations conducted in the NCR, may be undertaken to identify airspace controls 
and alternative security measures that strike an appropriate balance between meeting 
security needs and maintaining a vibrant GA industry in the region. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
14 Opening Statement of Chairman Tom Davis, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House 
of Representatives. Controlling Restricted Airspace: An Examination of the Management and 
Coordination of Our National Air Defense. July 21, 2005. 
15 Ibid; Statement of Robert Sturgell, Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Before the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives. Controlling 
Restricted Airspace: An Examination of Management and Coordination of Air Defense. July 21, 
2005. 
16 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. “AOPA Opposes Another Pilot Penalty Bill.” 
Frederick, MD: July 27, 2005. 
